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A R T I C L E S

Comparing the
Clean Air Act and
a Carbon Price
by Nathan Richardson and
Arthur G. Fraas
Nathan Richardson and Arthur G. Fraas are a resident scholar
and visiting scholar, respectively, at Resources for the Future.

Summary
Over the last half-decade, a variety of federal legislative proposals for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions have been put forward, most of which
would set a price on carbon. As of early 2013, the one
politically plausible policy appears to be a carbon tax,
passed as part of a larger fiscal reform package. Meanwhile, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has
begun regulating GHG emissions from a variety of
sources using its authority under the Clean Air Act.
It may be necessary to choose between these two policies, however. The Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade
bill that failed in 2009 would have preempted much
of this authority, and it appears likely that a carbon
tax law would do the same. But how can one make
this choice?

O

ver the last half-decade, a variety of federal legislative proposals for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions have been put forward, with varying
levels of enthusiasm in the U.S. Congress, the policy community, and among the public. Those proposals that would
set a price on carbon—a GHG cap-and-trade system or a
carbon tax—are most favored by economists, but others,
like clean energy standards, have at one time or another
been the policy du jour. As of today, the most politically
plausible pricing policy appears to be a carbon tax, passed
as part of a larger fiscal reform package.
Over the same period, and especially under President
Barack Obama after 2008, an alternative vehicle for climate policy has emerged—U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) regulation authorized by the Clean Air Act
(CAA).1 Regulation of road vehicles has been strengthened
to limit GHG emissions. Other regulation has been formally proposed for new power plants and is under consideration for existing power plants and, perhaps, other
emitting sectors. The possible impact of this regulation
on U.S. GHG emissions is significant. Research suggests
that, along with reductions already taking place because
of market factors—especially the post-2008 recession and
recent low prices of natural gas—CAA regulation may be
sufficient to reach the president’s goal of 17% emissions
reductions over 2005 levels by 2020, as stated in Copenhagen in 2010.2
This regulatory pathway is unpopular in Congress, with
Republicans and even some Democrats actively seeking
to block specific regulations or to adopt legislation stripping EPA of climate-related authority. Many greens, on
the other hand, argue that new federal climate policy (like
a carbon tax) is compatible with parallel CAA regulation
and that existing authority should be preserved.
Congress may or may not pass new climate legislation,
and it may or may not pass legislation limiting EPA authority under the CAA. This results in four possibilities for
U.S. climate policy.
EPA authority
mostly/wholly
preempted
No new climate 1. No federal climate
policy
legislation
New climate
legislation

1.	
2.	
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3. Carbon price
supplants EPA
regulation

EPA authority
mostly left intact
2. EPA regulates under
the CAA (status
quo)
4. Parallel EPA regulation and carbon
price

42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
Dallas Burtraw & Matt Woerman, U.S. Status on Climate Change Mitigation, RFF Discussion Paper 12-48 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.rff.
org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22073.
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In the first and fourth scenarios, it is not necessary to
compare the merits of the two options—you have both,
or you have neither, so no choice is necessary.3 But the second and third scenarios set up a choice. Will such a choice
be necessary? The outcome of negotiations over any legislation, especially in an area as politically contentious as
climate, is very hard to predict. This is especially true for
us—we are not political experts. But evidence suggests that
the second and third scenarios are more likely.
Proposals to simply strip EPA authority have failed,
despite some support. Some proposals for new carbon
legislation would not preempt CAA authority, but by far
the most successful such proposal to date—the WaxmanMarkey cap-and-trade bill that passed the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2009—would have preempted most
of EPA’s climate-related authority. These events lead us
to conclude that either the status quo or new legislation
partially or completely preempting the CAA (as applied to
GHGs) are the most politically plausible outcomes.
If this is right, then a choice between the two policies
will be necessary. But how can one make this choice? What
are the key questions and issues to consider? The purpose
of this Article is to compare these policies. Even if one
disagrees with our assumption that a choice between the
policy pathways is politically necessary, this comparison
remains a relevant, though not complete, analysis of the
plausible outcomes.
Both policies are aimed at the same problem: reducing
emissions that contribute to climate change. Economists
have long argued that pricing an externality is the most
cost-effective way to deal with it, so replacing an ostensibly inferior instrument (traditional regulatory tools) with
a carbon price is appealing. But the CAA is not as poor
a fit for climate policy as is commonly believed. It is also
not monolithic—the statute includes many tools aimed at
different kinds of emissions sources. A combination of a
carbon price and EPA regulation, as would have existed
had Waxman-Markey passed, is possible. Moreover, any
carbon price passed by Congress will inevitably require
compromises that take it away from blackboard ideals. As
a result, whether the existing policy pathway should be
traded for a new one is a valid question. The right answer
greatly depends on the details of a new policy and of what,
exactly, is being given up.
Also, no proposed carbon legislation currently has
broad support, and significant parts of EPA’s regulatory plans under the CAA remain unknown. In other
words, we do not have two concrete, well-defined proposals to compare.

Our aim in this Article is therefore not to determine
whether a trade of policies is wise or unwise. Instead, our
intention is to give policymakers, stakeholders, and other
interested readers an impartial assessment of both policies and, in particular, the features that are important to
a comparative evaluation. In other words, we will not give
answers, but hope at least to give the right questions to ask.
To do this, we first briefly outline the competing policies.4 Next, we describe how a policy trade might happen,
drawing on one available example—the 2009 WaxmanMarkey cap-and-trade bill. Finally, we discuss the relative
merits of the two policy pathways, with particular emphasis on what aspects of a proposed carbon price and the asyet-undetermined parts of an EPA-led approach are most
important to that comparison.

3.	

4.	

However, it is true that the fourth scenario—coexistence—requires careful
analysis of interactions between the two policies, some of which would be
similar to the comparative analysis presented here.
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I.

Climate Policy Under Existing
Legislation

The CAA, as first passed in the 1970s and amended most
recently in 1990, is the primary federal vehicle for regulation of air pollution and arguably the most significant
statute in American environmental law. It is a complex law,
with many regulatory schemes aimed at different types of
pollutants emitted from different classes of sources. Congress delegates significant authority in the Act to EPA, not
only over implementation and enforcement, but also over
the scope of regulation itself. As an expert Agency, EPA is
required to regularly reassess threats to health and welfare
from air pollution, and to modify its regulations as necessary. This includes the authority to regulate new pollutants
as their effects become known.
Until quite recently, the view that this authority extended
to regulation of GHGs based on their climate effects was
confined to a minority in the legal and policy communities. Under the George W. Bush Administration, EPA itself
disavowed authority to regulate GHGs under the Act. In
the mid-2000s, some states and environmental groups
sued EPA, challenging this view, and eventually prevailed
in Massachusetts v. EPA.5 The U.S. Supreme Court held in
Massachusetts that GHGs are pollutants within the definition of the CAA, opening the door to regulation.
Under President Obama, EPA has moved to limit GHG
emissions from a variety of sources. Briefly describing these
actions is useful for understanding not only the current
state of GHG regulation, but also the varied set of tools
available under the statute, any or all of which might be
preempted by new climate legislation.

5.	

Note that here we only compare the CAA to new legislation setting a carbon
price, not to alternative policies, like a clean energy standard.
549 U.S. 497, 37 ELR 20075, 37 ELR 20075 (2007).
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Road Vehicles

Title II of the CAA gives EPA extensive authority to regulate emissions from vehicles, or “mobile sources.” EPA
first moved to limit GHG emissions from on-road cars
and trucks, driven in part by the fact that the parties in
Massachusetts were specifically seeking such regulation.
In late 2009, the Agency issued final “endangerment” and
“cause/contribute” findings. The former identified GHGs
as a threat to human health and welfare and is the trigger and basis for all subsequent GHG regulation under
the Act. The latter identified road vehicles as a source of
significant GHG emissions. Together, these actions provide the basis for the regulation of GHG emissions from
road vehicles.
Since 2009, EPA and the U.S. Department of Transportation have issued stringent new revised corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for light-duty vehicles
through the 2025 model year (MY) and for heavy-duty
vehicles through the 2018 MY. These standards require
manufacturers to improve the fuel economy of vehicles
they produce. Light-duty vehicles are to achieve up to an
average of 54.5 miles per gallon (mpg) for vehicles produced in 2025, with a projected reduction in lifetime GHG
emissions for MY 2012 to 2025 of around three billion
metric tons.6

B.

Electric Generation

Title I of the CAA gives EPA a variety of tools with which
to regulate emissions from “stationary sources.” Fossil
fuel-fired power plants comprise by far the largest class of
emitters in this group (and in the U.S. economy). EPA has
moved to regulate GHG emissions from these sources as
well, though it has done so more deliberately than for the
transportation sector. Newly constructed and/or upgraded
sources face different regulations than existing, unmodified sources.

1.

New Source Review

All significant new emissions sources are required to
undergo “new source review” (NSR) under the CAA. This
process requires operators to show that they have installed
“best available control technology” (BACT), a determination made on a case-by-case basis. Beginning in January
2011, EPA has required operators to show that they are
using BACT for GHG emissions as well as “conventional”
pollutants like sulfur dioxide (SO2). This regulation was
challenged on a variety of legal grounds, but in 2012, the
6.	

U.S. EPA, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, EPA and NHTSA Finalize Historic National Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Improve
Fuel Economy for Cars and Trucks, EPA-420-F-10-014 (Apr. 2010), available
at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/420f10014.pdf; U.S. EPA,
Office of Transportation and Air Quality, EPA and NHTSA Set Standards
to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Improve Fuel Economy for Model Years 20172025 Cars and Light Trucks, EPA-420-F-12-051 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420f12051.pdf.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.)
Circuit upheld the rule.

2.

Title V Operating Permits

Emitters are also required to obtain operating permits
under Title V of the CAA. These impose no additional
requirements, but rather consolidate existing requirements, including those applicable to GHG emissions, into
a single permit.

3.

New Source Performance Standards

EPA may also issue new source performance standards
(NSPS) under §111 of the CAA. These standards impose
minimum national performance criteria for all sources in
a given category. In practice, they operate as a floor for the
case-by-case NSR process. In late 2010, EPA committed
to issue NSPS for GHG emissions from power plants in a
settlement agreement with several states. In 2012, it issued
(and in 2013 revised) a formal proposal for most classes of
new fossil fuel plants, setting a standard that can be met
only by natural gas plants or by coal plants with carbon
capture and storage (CCS) technology. The effect of this
proposal would be to ban construction of new coal plants
without CCS.7

4.

Existing Source Performance Standards

Neither of these regulatory programs (NSR and NSPS)
affect existing plants, unless those plants undergo major
modifications that trigger the NSR process. For existing
sources, the president has directed EPA to lead a process,
under §111(d) of the CAA, in which states will issue existing source performance standards (ESPS). This provision
of the Act has only rarely been used, and EPA has yet to
propose any guidelines for such standards, despite having
committed to do so by mid-2012 in the 2010 settlement
agreement. In mid-2013, however, President Obama committed EPA to propose §111(d) guidelines by June 2014
and finalize them by June 2015, with states to be given
until June 2016 to submit their implementation plans (that
is the details of how they will regulate).8 As of this writing,
EPA appears on schedule to meet this latest commitment.9
Legal and economic analysis indicates that EPA could
create a relatively flexible set of ESPS with achievable emissions targets and a trading system to reduce costs.10
7.	

This prohibition takes effect even before the rule is finalized, though EPA
could in principle withdraw or alter the ban before that point.
8.	 See Presidential Memorandum—Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards,
June 25, 2013, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollutionstandards.
9.	 See Andrew Childers, EPA Proposal to Regulate Carbon Dioxide From Existing Plants Under OMB Review, Daily Env’t Rep., Apr. 2, 2014, available at
http://www.bna.com/epa-proposal-regulate-n17179889328/.
10. See Nathan Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean
Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway, RFF
Discussion Paper 10-23 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/News/
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Because of the amount of emissions from existing
sources and the range of regulatory options available, EPA’s
decisions on power-sector ESPS are the most significant it
will make in regulating GHGs under the CAA.

C.

Other Sectors and Tools

Transportation and electric power are by far the largestemitting sectors of the U.S. economy, so it is natural for
EPA to have focused its regulatory efforts on these sectors.
The CAA, however, gives the Agency much broader authority. In its 2010 settlement agreement, the Agency committed to issue NSPS and ESPS for the refining sector as well
as for fossil electric power. The Agency has not fulfilled this
commitment and shows no signs of doing so soon, but it
unambiguously has the power to do so, not only for refining, but for many other sectors that emit GHGs. Iron and
steel, cement, chemicals, and other manufacturing sectors
are the most obvious candidates.
EPA also has authority to regulate emissions from parts
of the transportation sector other than road vehicles.
Aviation, shipping, and “nonroad” land vehicles are all
regulated under the CAA, and these regulations could be
extended or expanded to cover GHG emissions.
The CAA also includes other regulatory tools for stationary (and, in some cases, other) sources; these tools
have not been considered good fits for GHG regulation
but could, in principle, be used in the future. EPA could
classify GHGs as “criteria pollutants” and impose national

44 ELR 10475

ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under §110 of the
Act, as it has done with the six conventional pollutants
(e.g., lead, SO2, and ozone). It could also designate GHGs
“hazardous air pollutants” under §112 or attempt to regulate them under §115, a relatively obscure provision targeting international emissions. EPA also has authority under
Title VI of the CAA to regulate pollutants that affect the
ozone layer, some of which are also GHGs.
Table 1 shows the most significant climate-related regulatory options under the CAA and their current status.

D.

Other Environmental Statutes

Though it is by far the most important, the CAA is not
the only environmental statute that grants (or could be
interpreted to grant) regulatory authority based on risks
from climate change. For example, species threatened
by climate-related habitat disruption could, in principle,
qualify for protection under the Endangered Species
Act,11 though the current Administration has disavowed
the use of that statute as a vehicle for climate regulation.
Under some theories, this would give regulators authority
to impose emissions restrictions. The Clean Water Act12
might grant similar authority to the extent that carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions threaten U.S. waters with acidification. Although it is not possible to describe and evaluate
these extra-CAA regulatory possibilities here,13 it is likely
that they will at least be considered in negotiations over
new climate legislation.

Table 1. Primary Climate-Related Regulatory Options Under the CAA
Program
Mobile sources
Fuel economy stds. (CAFE)
Emissions stds.
Stationary sources
New source review (NSR) permits
Title V operating permits
New source performance stds. (NSPS)

Existing source performance stds. (ESPS)

Other
National ambient air quality stds. (NAAQS)
Hazardous air pollutant (HAP) regs.
Stratospheric ozone pollutant regs.
International pollutant regs.

Sources covered

CAA §

Status

§202
§202
§231
§213

Final
Final
Unknown
Unknown

Large new sources in all sectors
Large existing sources in all sectors
New fossil power plants
New oil/gas refineries
New/modified sources in other sectors
Existing fossil power plants
Existing oil/gas refineries
All other stationary sectors

§165
Title V
§111
§111
§111
§111(d)
§111(d)
§111(d)

Final
Final
Proposed
Promised
Unknown
Promised
Promised
Unknown

All sectors
All stationary sectors
All emitters
All emitters

§110
§112
Title VI
§115

Unlikely
Unlikely
Unknown
Unlikely

Light-duty motor vehicles
Heavy-duty motor vehicles
Aviation
Maritime and nonroad

Features/Pages/Greenhouse-Gas-Regulation-under-the-Clean-Air-ActStructure-Effects-and-Implications-of-a-Knowable-Pathway.aspx.

11. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544, ELR Stat. ESA §§2-18.
12. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA §§101-607.
13. See Peter Anderson, Climate Change Regulatory Authority Beyond the Clean
Air Act, RFF Discussion Paper 12-39 (July 2012), available at http://www.
rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-39.pdf.
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New Legislation: Putting a Price on
Carbon
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federal budget deficit—particularly with the substantial
projected growth in entitlement expenditures. Alternatively, a carbon tax could be structured to replace more
regressive taxes (e.g., a payroll tax) or taxes that retard capital investment and the formation of small business (e.g.,
corporate or business taxes).

The classic approach economists use to address externalities, like the climate change effects of carbon emissions,
is to incorporate the cost of the externality in commodity prices. The incorporation of a carbon price confronts
the users/consumers with the cost of the external damages associated with production of the commodity so
that they reduce their consumption of carbon-producing
goods. It also provides producers with an incentive to find
ways to reduce the carbon emissions arising from their
production of the commodity. As one scholar puts it, “[c]
arbon pricing is the only signal that can cut through the
noise and direct diverse economic actors toward smart,
green investments.”14
One can create a carbon price using either of two
approaches: impose a carbon tax; or create a market for
emissions (e.g., through a cap-and-trade program). The
failed Waxman-Markey legislation (discussed below)—
which was adopted by the House, but never reached a
vote in the U.S. Senate in 2009—would have established
a cap-and-trade program. An alternative to WaxmanMarkey introduced in the Senate by Sens. Maria Cantwell
(D-Wash.) and Susan Collins (R-Maine)—the Carbon
Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal Act—would
have set up an auction mechanism for selling “carbon
shares” to fuel producers.15
In February 2013, Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.) and
Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) proposed a bill to tax carbon emissions. The bill would tax emissions of the economy’s largest
upstream fossil fuel producers—coal mines, oil refineries, and natural gas-processing plants—but it would not
directly include electricity-generating plants that would
continue to be regulated by EPA (though fossil plants
would be exposed to the tax indirectly through fuel prices).
The carbon tax would initially be set at $20 per ton of
CO2-equivalent and would increase by 5.6% per year over
a 10-year period. According to the sponsors, the bill would
raise $1.2 trillion in revenues by 2020.
The adoption of a carbon tax has emerged as an increasingly attractive approach—at least within some circles—as
a way to kill two birds with one stone. Not only would
it establish a price for carbon, but it could also provide a
source of federal government revenue to address a growing

Because the CAA is modular, whether to exchange existing authority for new legislation is complex. All parts of
the statute need not be preempted, and creative trades
that divide authority over various sectors between existing
CAA regulation and a new carbon price mechanism are
possible, at least in principle. This part describes one such
trade, though, of course, many others are possible, up to
and including full preemption of CAA authority to regulate based on climate risks.
The 2009 Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill (H.R.
2454) narrowly passed the House. No parallel measure
passed the Senate, and therefore no bill reached the president’s desk. Nevertheless, the bill does represent the high
watermark (to date) for climate legislation, and is therefore
a useful model. As noted above, the bill would have created a comprehensive cap-and-trade system covering most
U.S. GHG emissions, and also would have stripped EPA of
much—but not all—of its existing climate-related authority under the CAA.
Specifically, Waxman-Markey would have eliminated
EPA authority to consider GHG emissions in the NSR process, to regulate GHGs as criteria or hazardous pollutants,
to regulate GHGs based on their international effects, and
to issue GHG performance standards (NSPS and ESPS)
for sources subject to the emissions cap.16 It would have
preserved EPA authority to issue performance standards
for relatively minor classes of sources not subject to the cap.
More importantly, EPA also would have retained authority
to regulate transportation-sector emissions with fuel economy standards. CAFE regulation would have continued to
require vehicles to meet fleet average standards, though the
cap-and-trade system would have included emissions of the
upstream producers/importers of petroleum fuels—with
downstream effects on fuel prices. Table 2 shows the status
of climate-related regulatory options under the CAA had
Waxman-Markey become law.

14. See Michael A. Livermore, Unlocking the Green Economy, Institute for
Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law Policy, Brief No.
2 (2008) at 1, http://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/unlocking-thegreen-economy/ (last visited May 2, 2014).
15. Note that, unlike Waxman-Markey itself, this bill would not have preempted EPA authority under the CAA.

16. The bill would have imposed performance standards, set specifically by
statute, on coal plants—but only after CCS technology had been commercially demonstrated.

III. Waxman-Markey: An Example Trade

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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Table 2. Climate-Related Regulatory Options Under the CAA With Waxman-Markey
Program

Sources covered

CAA §

Status

Light-duty motor vehicles

§202

Retained

Heavy-duty motor vehicles

§202

Retained

Aviation

§231

Retained

Maritime and nonroad

§213

Retained

Mobile sources
Fuel economy stds. (CAFE)
Emissions stds.
Stationary sources
New source review (NSR) permits

Large new sources in all sectors

Title V operating permits

Large existing sources in all sectors

New source performance stds. (NSPS)

New sources in capped sectors
New sources in uncapped sectors

§111

Modified

Existing source performance stds. (ESPS)

Existing sources in capped sectors

§111(d)

Preempted

§165

Preempted

Title V

Preempted

§111

Preempted

Existing sources in uncapped sectors

Modified

Other
National ambient air quality stds. (NAAQS) All sectors

Preempted

Hazardous air pollutant (HAP) regs.

All stationary sectors

§112

Preempted

Stratospheric ozone pollutant regs.

All emitters

Title VI

Modified

International pollutant regs.

All emitters

§115

Preempted

Whether any future trade of existing CAA authority for
carbon price legislation would follow similar lines is impossible to know. Since 2010, much has been learned about
regulatory options under the existing act as EPA has moved
to actually use its authority. This has increased anxiety and
opposition among many in industry, but has also endeared
many environmental groups to CAA climate authority.
Both sides’ positions therefore appear to have become more
entrenched, though public statements likely reflect bargaining positions rather than truly held views.
The Waxman-Markey policy trade does illustrate two
important points, however. First, the modular character of
the CAA makes partial trades possible. Second, the more
politically popular a CAA program is, the less likely it is to
be sacrificed in a bargain for climate legislation.

IV.

§110

Advantages and Disadvantages

Up to this point, we have merely described these two policy
options—new carbon legislation and CAA regulation. But
evaluating an exchange (or negotiating one) requires direct
comparisons of their relative merits. To that end, this part
discusses the relative advantages and disadvantages of the
two policies in a variety of areas.
Generally, we assume that the goal of any climate policy
is to achieve a specified emissions reduction at the lowest
cost (or the greatest emissions reduction at a specified cost),
regardless of what sector—or even what country—those
reductions come from. But, as the following discussion
shows, there are other dimensions to consider in addition
to the economic cost of making reductions. Administrative
costs and political risk can vary, and policies that look good
in the short term may be inferior over the long term.

Also, a climate policy may have other goals: reducing
emissions from a particular sector, reducing domestic emissions only, encouraging renewable energy or demand-side
energy efficiency, or enabling progress in international
negotiations, for example. We mention these where relevant, but our ultimate focus is on a policy’s ability to
achieve the lowest-cost GHG emissions reductions.

A.

General Cost-Effectiveness

The consensus view among economists is that the most
cost-effective policy for addressing externalities is to put a
price on them. In the GHG context, this can be achieved
either by setting a price explicitly, as a carbon tax would do,
or by establishing a market-based approach like a cap-andtrade system. Economists often contrast a price approach
with traditional “command-and-control” regulation, of
which the CAA is often given as an example.
The superior cost-effectiveness (defined as cost per unit
of emissions reduction) of externality pricing is in large
part due to information asymmetry. Regulators (or, more
broadly, government) set the cap or price, but producers
and consumers have better information about how emissions can most cheaply be reduced in production and
consumption of goods and services. Resulting changes in
the prices of goods and services lead consumers to adjust
their purchases by substituting away from higher priced,
carbon-intensive goods. Pricing the externality harnesses
market forces to achieve the most cost-effective reductions,
rather than relying on regulators’ best estimates. The sheer
scope of GHG regulation makes flexible, cost-effective
approaches extremely important.

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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Past experience has shown that market-based approaches
can achieve emissions reductions at significantly lower cost
than initially estimated, and that such approaches could be
much more cost-effective than traditional regulation under
the CAA.
This comparison assumes that the CAA is inflexible.
In some ways, this is true. Many of the tools available to
EPA under the CAA are relatively rigid, and require EPA
to invest significant technical resources to estimate achievable targets. For example, air quality standards (NAAQS)
are, by definition, nationally uniform—the same standards apply everywhere regardless of how costly it is to
achieve them. Some programs can even create perverse
incentives—NSR, for example, may discourage firms from
upgrading older, less-efficient facilities because doing so
would trigger an expensive permit process. Technologybased standards, like NSPS, that effectively mandate a
specific control technology, at least as traditionally implemented, can stall innovation because of the limited incentive to make further technological improvements.
But the CAA is not as inflexible as it is often characterized. At least some examples of market-based environmental regulation—on which the reputation of such tools for
cost-effectiveness is based—are, in fact, CAA programs.
The SO2 cap-and-trade system created by Title IV of the
Act and, to a lesser extent, nitrogen oxide (NOx) trading
programs created under the NAAQS provisions are both
viewed as cost-effective success stories. To be fair, Congress explicitly and uniquely crafted the Title IV program,
and the NOx programs were built under CAA provisions
(NAAQS) that are very unlikely to be applied to GHGs.
Also, some court decisions have sharply limited the flexibility of these programs,17 though the Supreme Court’s recent
holding in EPA v. EME Homer City appears to signal better
future prospects for flexibility, at least under NAAQS.18
Nevertheless, significant regulatory flexibility appears to
be available to the Agency in those programs that will constitute the core of a CAA-driven approach to GHG regulation. In the transportation sector, new CAFE standards
for MYs to 2025 are calibrated to vehicle size (preserving
consumer choice) and allow trading among manufacturers (probably reducing costs and increasing incentives to
become more efficient).19 Legal analysis indicates that the
Agency could also pursue flexible, market-based regulation
for aviation emissions.20
Most importantly, EPA appears to have broad authority to implement flexible, market-based performance standards for ESPS. Legal analysis indicates that the Agency,
17. Because the Title IV program was explicitly set out by Congress, the court
found, in its recent Clean Air Interstate Rule decision, that EPA could not
alter the program as a part of its efforts to achieve further reductions in
SO2 emissions. In addition, recent court decisions severely constrain any
interstate trading program—like the NOx trading program or the Clean Air
Interstate Rule—set up under the requirements of NAAQS.
18. Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, 572
U.S. __ (2014)
19. The trading is authorized by separate statute.
20. See Nathan Richardson, Aviation, Carbon, and the Clean Air Act, 38 Col. J.
Envtl. L. 67 (2013).
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working in concert with states, can implement a tradable performance standard or perhaps even a form of cap
and trade with its authority under this part of the CAA.21
Indeed the Bush EPA attempted to implement a cap-andtrade system for mercury emissions using the same authority in 2005, though courts struck down that effort for
unrelated reasons. Economic analysis indicates that such
flexible regulation (a tradable standard) could result in
overall cost savings of two-thirds over a similarly stringent
inflexible approach.22
Because ESPS will be the primary regulatory tool for the
largest-emitting sector of the economy (fossil fuel electric
power), using flexible tools here will have major impacts on
the cost-effectiveness of CAA climate policy. Because the
Agency has yet to propose ESPS for any sector, whether it
will actually adopt a flexible approach is unclear. But it has
the option to do so.
There are limits, however. EPA’s ability to allow emissions trading between sectors is unclear, and even if doing
so is legal, technical barriers may prevent it in practice.
The Agency also may not be able to include some flexible
compliance options, like credits for renewable generation
or demand-side energy efficiency or emissions offsets that
would be possible under new carbon legislation.23 Further,
because the Agency would need to set sector- or subsectorlevel emissions targets, this approach remains informationintensive relative to an approach that sets a uniform national
carbon price. Once relatively obvious “low-hanging fruit”
opportunities for emissions reductions are identified and
exploited, it will become more difficult for EPA to avoid
costly missteps. Perverse incentives from NSR could also
erode the benefits of flexible ESPS if interactions between
the two are not addressed.24
As we have stated in the past,25 our research indicates
that, contrary to commonly held views, the CAA can be
a flexible and cost-effective tool for GHG regulation, at
least over the short term. The cost-effectiveness of the CAA
relative to new carbon legislation depends on important
details. If EPA adopts flexible, multisector ESPS that survives legal challenge, initial CAA cost-effectiveness could
be similar to that of a carbon price. This is less likely if the
CAA is compared to new carbon price legislation, including broad flexibility options like international emissions
offsets (though many question the validity and verifiabil21. See Gregory Wannier et al., Prevailing Academic View on Compliance Flexibility Under §111 of the Clean Air Act, RFF Discussion Paper 11-29 (July
2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-11-29.
pdf.
22. See Dallas Burtraw et al., Retail Electricity Price Savings From Compliance
Flexibility in GHG Standards for Stationary Sources, 42 Energy Pol’y 67
(2012).
23. For a detailed discussion of flexibility options available (and not available)
under the CAA, see Nathan Richardson, Playing Without Aces: Offsets and
the Limits of Flexibility Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 42 Envtl. L.
735 (2012).
24. For example, firms may choose not to take cost-effective actions to comply
with ESPS if they fear it will trigger costly NSR.
25. See Nathan Richardson et al., The Return of an Old and Battle-Tested Friend,
The Clean Air Act, 176 Resources (2010), http://www.rff.org/Publications/
Resources/Pages/The-Return-of-an-Old-Battle-Tested-Friend-176.aspx
(last visited May 2, 2014).
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ity of such offsets). Over the long term, however, the costeffectiveness advantages of new carbon legislation are likely
to predominate.

Questions to ask:
• Will regulation of existing sources under the CAA be
flexible, allowing trading between emitters? Will it
allow trading between sectors?
• Does the legislative proposal provide flexibility, such
as international offsets, not available under the CAA?

amount of achievable reductions very much. However,
under CAA regulation, no trading between these two
sectors is possible. Because their marginal cost of emissions reduction is almost certainly different, this reduces
cost-effectiveness.
As noted above, new carbon legislation could access
international offsets. Doing so effectively increases the
scope of the policy, accessing even cheaper emissions
reductions than are available in any sector of the economy.

Questions to ask:

• If new legislation is not passed now, how long
will CAA alternatives remain in place? In other
words, when will carbon legislation again be
politically plausible?

B.

• How broad is the scope of the carbon legislation? Is
it economywide or does it cover only major emitting sectors?
• Has EPA shown willingness to regulate sectors
beyond fossil electric power and road vehicles? (To
date, it has only expressed an intent to regulate petroleum refineries, but not other sectors, and recent
indications are that even refinery standards may be
put off indefinitely.27)

Scope

A carbon price could, in principle, cover all GHG emissions throughout the U.S. economy. This has two advantages. First and most obviously, only covered sources have
an incentive to reduce their emissions. Second, the broader
the scope, the greater the availability of opportunities to
reduce emissions at low cost on the part of both producers
and consumers. A broader scope means greater emissions
reductions at a given price, or a lower price for a given level
of emissions reductions.
The scope of the CAA is more limited, however. Some
sectors, such as agriculture, are largely outside the reach
of the CAA because they are neither mobile nor stationary sources according to CAA definitions. Such “nonpoint” sources may also be difficult to reach with a carbon
price mechanism because emissions are hard to measure
and track—a carbon price embedded in fuel and fertilizer
prices helps, but some practices, such as tilling and feedlots, are hard to reach with price incentives.
Also, the CAA generally requires a sector-by-sector
approach. EPA must develop, propose, review comments,
finalize, and implement performance standards or other
regulation for each sector. These must each also survive any
related litigation. EPA has broad authority to define sectors, but excessively broad definitions are impractical and
possibly illegal. This means that it will take many years
before the scope of CAA-driven climate policy can match
that of new carbon legislation, even if the maximum scope
of both is similar in principle.
On the other hand, EPA has already moved to regulate one of the two largest sectors (road vehicles) and is
on the path toward regulating the other (fossil electric
power). Together, these sectors account for the majority
of U.S. emissions (about 67%).26 Only if very low-cost
emissions-reduction opportunities are available in other
sectors will incorporating them change the cost and/or
26. U.S. EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, EPA 430R-12-001 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf.
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C.

Stringency

Congress is free to set whatever emissions cap or carbon
tax level it wants to. The CAA also does not specify stringency. Instead, it establishes goals or targets based on
health or welfare, and requires EPA to regulate adequately
to meet them. In some programs, such as NAAQS, these
requirements are ultimately driven by scientific judgments
based on health or welfare effects. Other provisions require
technology-based standards. For the CAA programs most
relevant to GHG regulation (CAFE and NSPS/ESPS),
EPA has relatively broader discretion over stringency. In
contrast to health- or welfare-based CAA programs, the
Agency is permitted to consider technical feasibility, compliance costs, the “remaining useful life” of sources, and,
presumably, overall program cost-effectiveness. However,
like all Agency decisions, EPA action under the CAA must
fall within the bounds of reasonableness given the limitations of its statutory authority.
This flexibility means there is relatively little a priori
basis for separating new carbon legislation from CAA
regulation on stringency grounds. Neither pathway will
necessarily lead to a weak or strong policy; ultimately, any
judgment will have to be based on the specific program/
legislation. The policy goal should be compliance costs
approximately equal to the expected marginal damages
from carbon emissions. This is relatively easy to assess for
a carbon tax because the tax rate can be compared to an
27. See Environmentalists End Bid for Refinery Climate NSPS as EPA Delays
Rule, InsideEPA.com, Mar. 2014. available at http://insideepa.com/index.
php?option=com_user&view=login&return=aHR0cDovL2luc2lkZWVwYS
5jb20vMjAxNDA0MTcyNDY3OTMzL0VQQS1EYWlseS1OZXdzL0R
haWx5LU5ld3MvZW52aXJvbm1lbnRhbGlzdHMtZW5kLWJpZC1mb
3ItcmVmaW5lcnktY2xpbWF0ZS1uc3BzLWFzLWVwYS1kZWxheXMtcn
VsZS9tZW51LWlkLTk1Lmh0bWw/cz1kbg==.
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estimate of marginal damage.28 EPA conducts cost-benefit
analysis of its major regulations, but the resulting standards
may be influenced by factors other than damage estimates.

Question to ask:
• How stringent is new carbon legislation, relative to
what EPA requires (or will require) from CAA-regulated sectors? Do compliance costs of either policy
better approximate estimated marginal damages?

D.

Revenue

The primary reason why new carbon legislation—in most
accounts, a carbon tax—is viewed as politically plausible
in the near term is the fact that it can raise a lot of revenue:
$120 billion annually for a $25/ton tax.29 This revenue
could be used to reduce budget deficits, to fund desired
or needed government activity, or to replace other taxes
with distortionary effects on the economy. A cap-and-trade
program would also generate revenue if allowances are auctioned, rather than freely allocated. Even if environmental
benefits are the driving reason for new legislation, generating revenue is a valuable side benefit. Opinions vary greatly
on the best use of revenue, with deficit reduction, replacement of distortionary taxes, or rebates directly to citizens
the most frequently advocated options. But all agree that
government revenue is an important benefit and an advantage of policy options that produce it.
EPA regulation under the CAA cannot generate federal
revenue. Congress did not delegate its tax power to the
Agency in the statute (and, historically, has almost never
made such a delegation). EPA does have authority to issue
fines for failure to comply with its regulations, but this
power probably could not be used to “tax” emissions. EPA
also almost certainly lacks authority to auction permits for
a cap-and-trade system. In short, EPA cannot create a carbon tax, and if its regulations involve tradable permits or
allowances, those allowances will almost certainly be given
away freely (grandfathered) to regulated emitters.
States with implementation authority under CAA programs like ESPS may generate revenue—they have independent authority and are not limited by the CAA in this
regard. For the same reason, however, states do not need
CAA regulation to raise revenue with carbon policy, as
illustrated by California’s use of revenue-generating auctions as part of its cap-and-trade program. In fact, new
legislation setting a national carbon price could erode revenues from these state-level climate policies.30
28. Estimating marginal damages of carbon emissions is hard, but no more so
for either policy.
29. See Ray Kopp et al., Considering a Carbon Tax: Frequently Asked Questions,
Resources for the Future (2012), available at http://www.rff.org/centers/climate_and_electricity_policy/pages/carbon_tax_faqs.aspx#Q2.
30. See Lawrence H. Goulder & Robert N. Stavins, Challenges From State—
Federal Interactions in U.S. Climate Change Policy, 101 Am. Econ. Rev.
253 (2011). For more on interactions between a carbon tax and state-level
climate policies, see Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Mixing It Up: Power

6-2014

In summary, a national carbon tax will generate revenue. A cap-and-trade program might. CAA regulation
cannot generate federal revenue. States can generate revenue from climate policies whether or not carbon is regulated under the CAA, though this ability may be undercut
by a national carbon price or incompatible EPA regulation.

Question to ask:
• Does new carbon legislation generate new revenue
and do something useful with it?

E.

Administrative Simplicity

A carbon tax could be very simple to administer, especially
a carbon tax on upstream sources of carbon emissions. A
relatively small number of oil and gas, industrial, and electric generation firms are responsible directly or indirectly
for the large majority of U.S. emissions. The U.S. Treasury
already administers tax systems covering coal mines and
oil and natural gas producers, so the adoption of a carbon
tax administered by Treasury on these energy producers
would be relatively straightforward.
A carbon price is not necessarily simple, however. A capand-trade system might or might not be administratively
complex, depending on its design. And either a carbon tax
or a cap-and-trade program could be burdened with complex carve-outs and concessions to special interests, such as
allowance allocation schemes or tax exemptions, that not
only make it more difficult to administer, but reduce its
cost-effectiveness and/or capacity to generate revenue.
CAA regulation will certainly be quite complex, however. As described above, many programs under the Act
are applicable to different classes of sources. Each requires
multiple rulemakings, and each is likely to be litigated.
Implementing regulations for even a single group of sectors takes years—longer if delayed by litigation. EPA has
limited resources and must therefore proceed sequentially.
Each regulation also creates ongoing administrative burdens not only for EPA, but also for the states, which share
in implementation of most CAA regulations. In particular, assessing the equivalency of various state policies with
ESPS guidelines set by EPA will be a difficult and burdensome process for both EPA and the states.
Moreover, regulation that works well in theory may not
work well in practice, at least initially. Regulators and regulated firms learn from experience, developing both institutions and relationships. Litigation over regulation develops
precedents that guide future regulation.
For CAA regulation, some of this work has already
been done. CAFE standards, for example, are well-understood by both regulators and the auto industry. On the
other hand, key parts of CAA climate regulation are not
yet well-understood. ESPS have only rarely been issued in
the past, and only for relatively small classes of emitters.
Sector Energy and Regional and Regulatory Climate Policies in the Presence of a
Carbon Tax, RFF Discussion Paper 13-09 (2013).
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Implementing standards for a large sector like fossil electric power will be a challenge requiring cooperation among
EPA, states, and regulated firms. Making this system flexible also means making it more complex.
Regulators will eventually work through these challenges—probably with the help of the courts—and the
resulting regulatory structure is likely to involve separate
trading approaches in some select sectors with technologybased standards in others.

Questions to ask:
• Is the new legislative proposal relatively simple and
easy to administer, or is it burdened with complex
programs and carve-outs for different sectors?
• Are the agencies charged with administering the carbon price proposal capable of doing so effectively?

F.

Litigation and Legal Risk

New carbon legislation faces very little legal risk—only a
finding that such legislation is unconstitutional could prevent its implementation, and such a finding has no apparent basis. In other words, Congress clearly has the authority
to tax and regulate GHG emissions.
Equally clearly, the CAA gives EPA regulatory authority over GHG emissions. The Supreme Court’s holding in
Massachusetts confirms this. But the limits of that authority, and some entire programs likely to be used by EPA to
regulate carbon, are untested. And almost every step the
Agency has taken to date has been subjected to legal challenge. This will certainly continue.
Litigation of CAA regulation offers a win-win outcome
for rent seekers. First, as discussed briefly above, it is likely
to delay EPA regulation—litigation increases the administrative costs to EPA of developing regulation, and can delay
its implementation. Even if individual regulations are not
stayed during litigation, uncertainty over the outcome of
cases may lead EPA to delay further steps, such as similar
regulation on other sectors.
Second, EPA regulations may be overturned by courts.
EPA may overreach and/or misinterpret the CAA, leading
it to waste effort developing regulations that courts eventually overturn or that the Agency must modify. Though our
analysis and that of others lead us to believe that CAA tools
can be quite broad and flexible, it is possible that courts
will disagree. Legal analysis of ESPS under §111(d) of the
statute, however convincing it may appear, has not been
tested in court because that section of the statute has only
rarely been used. Some other elements of a CAA approach
are similarly untested.
These legal risks are a significant threat to efficient
(cost-effective) CAA climate policy. They can be mitigated
if EPA takes a conservative approach, but doing so may
mean less-flexible, less-stringent, or simply less regulation. Another approach is to be bold in interpreting CAA
authority, but to make the most legally risky parts of rule-
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makings severable, so that adverse results in court do not
force the Agency to start from scratch.

Question to ask:
• Do the president and EPA appear willing to accept
legal risks associated with building a flexible and
cost-effective regulatory program?

G.

Updating Environmental Goals Over Time

Because of the cumulative nature of global warming gases
and the increase in global population and economic wealth
over time, emissions of GHGs in future years are likely to
impose larger damages than do current emissions. Thus,
one can identify an optimal path of increasing carbon
prices to address the projected increase in damages with
emissions in future years. In addition, policy is never made
with complete information. Over time, and with experience, the quality of information improves. For environmental policy, better science leads to better knowledge
of risks, and additional economic data results in a better
understanding of compliance costs. Updating policies to
reflect new information will therefore make them better
and more cost-effective. Policies that are not updated can
become stagnant, overcome by changing reality and even
by other policies. Thus, a policy that, at its outset, envisions
updating to reflect new information on climate risks and
compliance costs has clear advantages.
For example, the Title IV SO2 trading program created
by the 1990 Amendments to the CAA has been widely
acclaimed as a great success, with substantial cost savings
compared to more traditional regulation. Although the
SO2 program yielded a substantial cost-effective reduction
in SO2 emissions from electric power plants, new information on the health benefits of reducing SO2 emissions
emerging in the 1990s suggested that further significant
emissions reductions would yield additional benefits that
substantially exceeded the costs of further control. In
short, more-stringent regulation than required by Title IV
was justified. But the Title IV program was a unique creation of Congress—it delegated little discretion to EPA.
In particular, EPA could not change the stringency of the
program in response to this new information. Instead,
EPA used other CAA provisions to adopt a more stringent
SO2 emissions cap for plants in the eastern United States.
Although the resulting regulatory programs achieved further reductions in emissions, the judicial and regulatory
decisions associated with the last eight years of litigation
have undermined the Title IV trading system. One possible lesson from this experience is that Congress should
provide some mechanism for updating legislated regulatory programs in response to new information.
For many of the regulatory provisions in the CAA,
EPA serves as an expert Agency with authority to assess
and respond to new information. In particular, the NSPS
and ESPS programs must be regularly updated on a sched-
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ule set by statute. In fact, the sector-by-sector approach
required by the CAA implies at least some updating, as
each successive sector is regulated based on the best available information at the time. If EPA does not adequately
base regulations on the best available information, or does
not reassess its regulations in light of new information, it
can be sued. CAA-driven climate policy is therefore better
equipped to adapt to the new information that will surely
become available than simple carbon price legislation, like
a fixed, unchanging carbon tax.
EPA is often slow to react, however—it has often failed
to meet the eight-year schedule for updating NSPS. EPA
action often comes only in response to petition or litigation. Over the medium to long term, political turnover in
the executive branch can make EPA action unpredictable
or inconsistent.
Congress is also slow to revise environmental regulation. The last significant update to the CAA was in 1990,
and before that, 1977. If Congress is able to break the deadlock and pass carbon tax legislation, the resulting legislation could be in place without revision for a long time. The
likelihood, based on past experience, that Congress will be
unwilling or unable to revise legislation should be taken
into account when evaluating any legislation. To address
this issue, the legislation can provide for updating.
Since climate policy will probably require midcourse
corrections, then delegation to an expert agency offers
one way to achieve updating. Thus, Congress could pass a
carbon tax and delegate to the implementing agency (e.g.,
Treasury) the authority to adjust the tax rate, dependent
on new scientific and economic information. Or, authority
to revise the policy could be delegated to a new, independent institution. However, such a delegation is probably
unlikely—the power to tax is closely held.
If Congress is unwilling to delegate the authority to
modify the tax rate, it could instead include automatic triggers in the legislation. The tax rate/cap level could change
over time at a rate specified in the statute, approximating assumptions about future information. Policy change
could be automatically triggered by objective, observable
facts: it could become more stringent if atmospheric GHG
concentrations exceed a certain level, or less stringent if
economic growth falls below or unemployment exceeds a
set point. Or it could be set at a lower level (e.g., at a level
equal to the domestic cost of carbon), but ramp up to a
more-stringent level (e.g., a level equal to the global social
cost of carbon) if other countries adopt climate policies.
One could surely devise other options.
Including such triggers may make it more difficult to
pass legislation—for example, antitax advocate Grover
Norquist withdrew his initial acceptance of a revenueneutral carbon tax after concluding that, once created, it
would undoubtedly increase over time (presumably without reductions in other taxes that would preserve its revenue neutrality). An automatic updating provision would
only add to this concern. On the other hand, the associated
political opposition of including such a provision is prob-
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ably easier to overcome than the inertia associated with
reopening and renegotiating settled law in the future in
response to new information, as would eventually be necessary under a fixed carbon tax.
To be sure, a future Congress could override automatic
or delegated policy changes. But updating mechanisms
shift the default rule for policy updates. Instead of relying
on Congress to update policy in reaction to new information, Congress must act to prevent such updates. Given
recent experience, congressional inaction seems more likely
than congressional overreaction. In any case, Congress
could override not only future policy changes included
in new legislation, but also the authority to update that
has already been delegated to EPA. Congress can always
change the law.
If updating mechanisms are included, a CAA approach
is no longer inherently superior in terms of its ability to
adjust to new information, and the choice of policy pathway must depend on other considerations.

Question to ask:
• Does the proposed carbon legislation include mechanisms for updating stringency in response to new
information, or does stringency at least increase
over time?

H.

Capture and Political Compromise

Any policy is vulnerable to capture by special interests or
to being undermined by political horse-trading. A capand-trade system with allowance handouts to politically
powerful industries, or a carbon tax that excludes those
same industries, will be less cost-effective than a clean and
simple blackboard-ideal policy. Of course, some degree of
political compromise is probably necessary.31 How much,
and the extent to which those compromises will damage
policy effectiveness, is hard to say.
But EPA is also sensitive to political pressure and
rent-seeking. Congressional opposition to its proposals is
important because Congress is responsible for its annual
appropriations. Congress could even move to strip EPA
of its authority to regulate GHGs without replacing that
authority with new climate legislation. Bills that would
do so have already been introduced and have passed the
House. Though they have failed in the Senate, they have
attracted some Democratic support. Presidential signature
or a veto-proof majority would ultimately be required,
but either is possible in the future. Any carbon regulations implemented already by EPA could be invalidated
by such legislation. This is an important source of risk for
a CAA approach.
Of course, any legislation, including a new law creating
a carbon price, could be revised or repealed by a future
31. This observation has led Robert Stavins to argue in favor of a cap-and-trade
system over a carbon tax because necessary political compromises will not
affect its environmental effectiveness.
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Congress. But it is politically more difficult to repeal recent
legislation than an old law, like the CAA.
Politically powerful interests may also be able to exert
influence on EPA directly. EPA is part of the executive
branch, led by a president who is sensitive to his/her political constituencies and to the political effects of agency decisions. Future presidents may be able to reverse or modify
Agency CAA climate rules more easily than future Congresses can repeal or modify legislation simply by directing
EPA to loosen or eliminate those regulations (though some
evidence that doing so is reasonable would be required).
Moreover, even final EPA decisions can be challenged in
court. Although, in theory, courts should adjudicate these
suits without regard to the political power of the plaintiff,
in reality, politically and financially powerful interests are
more likely to have the resources and desire to litigate.
And even if they are not successful, the process of litigation itself can delay regulation, and the threat of litigation
can lead regulators to be less ambitious. Finally, the many
separate rulemakings over an extended period required for
EPA climate regulation results in many opportunities for
political influence.32
The best course is to evaluate carefully the inevitable
compromises included in any particular carbon legislation
and to weigh those compromises with the likely alternative
outcome under CAA regulation.

tially exempted from compliance responsibilities or might
receive compensating subsidies. Or “border adjustments”
(tariffs) could be imposed on trade with countries that lack
equivalent climate policies—though these are internationally controversial and possibly illegal under trade law.
Such measures could be included in any new carbon
legislation. Although such direct measures are unavailable
under the CAA, EPA could, and probably would, adjust
the stringency of its regulation to account for competitiveness and leakage effects.
The sector-by-sector nature of CAA regulation not only
allows but requires the Agency to treat sectors differently.
Many CAA programs, including ESPS, allow the Agency
to consider compliance costs in setting regulation. This
may extend to international competitiveness considerations. Leakage is an environmental issue that EPA would
be likely to consider. Even the order in which EPA regulates sectors is relevant here—by regulating EITE sectors
last, EPA effectively excludes them from compliance duties
for a time.
Congress has more and better tools for dealing with
competitiveness and leakage than EPA does. But EPA is
not required to ignore them.

Questions to ask:
• If needed, does new carbon legislation include measures for reducing leakage and competitiveness losses
in EITE industries?

Questions to ask:
• What political compromises to favored industries or
interests are included in new carbon legislation?
• How much do those compromises reduce the costeffectiveness of the program vis-à-vis CAA regulation?
• What is the likelihood that Congress will strip EPA
authority over GHGs or that the next president will
undo regulatory actions that have been taken?

I.

International Competitiveness and Emissions
Leakage

One drawback of unilateral climate policy is that it can
damage the competitiveness of U.S. firms that compete
globally, with adverse effects on growth and job creation in
the United States. This can also erode environmental benefits, as firms in countries without climate policy increase
production and, therefore, their emissions.33
The academic literature suggests that leakage and adverse
competitive effects from a small carbon tax are likely to be
modest. Nevertheless, pressure to include measures aimed
at mitigating these effects in any policy proposal may
be considerable. For example, firms in energy-intensive,
trade-exposed (EITE) sectors might be wholly or par32. On the other hand, this requires special interests to spread their resources,
possibly reducing their long-term effectiveness.
33. Reduced U.S. fuel consumption leads to lower global fuel prices, with similar leakage effects.
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• Are these measures overly broad, compromising the
effectiveness of the policy?

J.

International Signals

Climate change is a global problem, and reducing emissions of the GHGs that cause it is a global responsibility.
The United States, one of the largest emitters, has been
slower than most other developed economies to commit to
emissions reductions. Doing so would provide an important signal and could influence other countries to follow
suit through bi- or multilateral agreements.
But this signal depends on the strength and clarity of
U.S. action. If U.S. policy is relatively weak, or is perceived
to be so, it will not be influential. Similarly, if U.S. policy
is meaningful but difficult to understand, other countries
may undervalue it. The CAA is available off-the-shelf with
powerful, flexible tools to achieve significant emissions
reductions over the next decade. But the CAA is a complicated statute, especially for those with little experience
with American law. It is incremental, technocratic, and
relatively difficult to explain and understand. On the other
hand, EPA does estimate and monitor emissions reductions
associated with its regulations, and this monitoring—so
long as it is credible—may make understanding the details
of U.S. regulation less important.
In any event, regulating sector-by-sector, over time
makes it harder to make credible emissions reduction com-
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mitments. Even if CAA regulation is quite stringent, it may
be harder to convince foreign negotiators that it will lead to
more significant emissions reductions than it would be to
convince them under new legislation with relatively modest goals—though of course new legislation might itself be
complex and difficult to evaluate.
Because climate change is a global problem requiring
global limits on GHG emissions, unilateral action by the
United States will achieve only limited benefits in the
absence of substantial global GHG reductions. One advantage of a legislated program like a carbon tax is that it can
be structured to achieve initially only modest reductions
in GHGs and provide for a ramping up to more-stringent
emission reductions only if other countries also agree to
achieve commensurate reductions in GHG emissions. This
structure in a legislated program would both provide a signal and offer an incentive for further international agreement to limit GHG emissions. A CAA regulatory program
probably cannot be structured in a similar way to ramp up
the stringency in a way that is directly tied to international
agreements to restrict GHG emissions.34

Questions to ask:
• Does new carbon legislation provide a ready basis for
international negotiations?
• Will other countries be able to understand and value
CAA climate policy? Are other countries taking a
sector-by-sector, industry-by-industry regulatory
approach that parallels CAA regulation?

V.

Conclusions

CAA provides the set of tools being used today to build
climate policy at the federal level. New carbon legislation
might be politically possible, and the prospects for such
legislation appear to be greater over the long term.
New legislation has important advantages. The CAA is
an old statute and was not designed with climate problems
in mind or, with a few limited exceptions, with an appreciation of the ability of market mechanisms to address environmental problems cost-effectively. In comparison, new
legislation setting a carbon price would almost certainly be
built around cost-effective market mechanisms. It could be
simpler to administer and broader in scope, could access
international emissions either through offsets or by motivating negotiations, and it could raise revenue. In addition,
new carbon legislation could have symbolic advantages in

that it could send a strong and unmistakable signal that
the United States is addressing climate change. For these
reasons and others, an ideal carbon policy would certainly
reduce emissions at lower cost than a regulatory approach,
especially over the long term.
But new legislation will not be ideal, and the CAA
should not be underestimated. It is a flexible set of tools
that, though not perfect, has been proven effective by experience. It might be less vulnerable to being compromised
by inefficient political capture and horse-trading. Relative to a simple carbon tax, an important advantage is the
ability of expert agencies to update regulation over time
to respond to new information about environmental risks
and economic costs. In short, the CAA works today, can be
adapted to fit the climate problem relatively well, and can
evolve over time.
So, should the statute in the hand be traded for the
one in the bush? It depends. Ideal carbon legislation—an
administratively simple, economywide, uniform price, set
at a level approximating marginal damages from carbon
emissions, without handouts to politically powerful industries, and with a robust mechanism for updating the cap
or tax in response to new information—would be superior
to the current CAA. But such ideal legislation is extremely
unlikely in reality.
Until we know what compromises are necessary to get
carbon legislation through Congress, it is impossible to say
in the abstract whether it is wise to give up existing regulatory tools. Even once we do know what form of carbon
legislation is on the table, the choice will not be easy—not
only because judgment calls are difficult and may come
down to personal priorities, but also because comparative
evaluation is extremely complex. We only hope here to
have supplied the right questions to ask once such a proposal emerges.

34. The CAA generally directs EPA to regulate so as to protect health and/
or welfare, not to strategically influence other countries’ environmental regulations.
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